Oct 21 edition/Reporting & analysis
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AgentsAutonomy & tool use

Hacker used open-source AI agents to breach websites at more than 100 companies, including Deere, SharkNinja and Cummins

A Chinese-speaking operator ran autonomous agents on the open-source Cairn platform against more than 1,200 sites, reaching over 100 companies for roughly $5,000 in tokens. Researchers saw it only because the attacker's control panels were left exposed online.

From the reuters.com article of October 19, 2026 and cited sources: One operator's short instructions sent agents to probe e-commerce sites in the US, Canada, Australia and Japan for hours without human help. [2] [8] [9]

SOURCES[2] BNN Bloomberg – Reuters exclusive bnnbloomberg.ca[8] Yahoo Finance – Reuters exclusive ca.finance.yahoo.com[9] Quartz – Norforge says qz.com

AI-assisted, not human-edited. Methodology Corrections Who owns this site

KEY FACTS
What happened
One operator's short instructions sent agents to probe e-commerce sites in the US, Canada, Australia and Japan for hours without human help. [2] [8] [9]
Original source
reuters.com article, independent perspective
Brief by
AT Pulse research desk AI-assisted; publisher and contact on the desk page
When
October 19, 2026 article published
Evidence
11 sources across 10 sites
29/100RisingHow it’s measured

Hacker News · 7 likes · 1 comment

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THE CORE IDEAS4 TAKEAWAYS
01

One operator's short instructions sent agents to probe e-commerce sites in the US, Canada, Australia and Japan for hours without human help. NorForge researcher Snorre Fagerland estimated about $5,000 in total token spend, or about $50 per successful break-in. Separately, NorForge's report puts the cost at about $5 per task, failures included. Reuters confirmed Deere, SharkNinja and Cummins as victims. [2] [8] [9]

02

Cairn, which its author says was not built for hacking, coordinates agents through a shared blackboard. There, agents post findings and build on each other's work. In one case, the agents chained a writable memcached session store, unsafe PHP object handling and old Zend Framework flaws to plant hidden upload forms. About 10% of tasks reached their goal, and successful ones took just under 23 hours on average. [7] [10] [11]

03

Fagerland found about two dozen Cairn instances that anyone could reach without a login. The exposed panels showed the operations as they ran and held hundreds of stolen secrets. NorForge verified 11% of those secrets as still valid, which meant other parties could also have used the stolen credentials. [7] [11]

04

The case follows Anthropic's report on GTG-1002, a suspected state group that used Claude Code against about 30 organisations. It also follows Gambit Security's September finding that Cairn appeared in a card-theft campaign that hit at least 27 companies. Taken together, these reports show agent-driven intrusion moving from state espionage to cheap, financially motivated crime. [3] [5] [6]

WHY IT MATTERS

one operator's panels show agents chaining legacy PHP and Zend flaws over roughly a day per success with little human input.

Read the full assessment

Implication: low per-attempt costs make mid-sized e-commerce and vendor-hosted sites economical targets, raising the value of fast patching.

Executive brief

A single Chinese-speaking operator used autonomous AI agents to break into websites at more than 100 companies, including Deere, SharkNinja and Cummins, for about $5,000 in model tokens. That works out to roughly $50 per successful intrusion (BNN Bloomberg/Reuters). The instructions were under 100 Chinese characters, and the agents probed targets for hours with no human help. The campaign came to light only because the attacker left their own control panels open on the internet, where researcher Snorre Fagerland of NorForge found them by scanning.

What changed and event timeline

  1. Anthropic reports agentic espionage

    Anthropic says a suspected Chinese state group, GTG-1002, used Claude Code to carry out 80–90% of the tactical work against about 30 organisations (;).

  2. Gambit flags Cairn in a card-theft campaign

    Gambit Security reports that a Chinese-writing operator used the Strix, Cairn and Hermes agents to breach at least 27 companies and take more than 600,000 card records (;).

  3. Main campaign begins

    The most active operator starts targeting e-commerce sites in the US, Canada, Australia and Japan ().

  4. NorForge finds exposed panels

    From around this date, Fagerland finds about two dozen malicious Cairn instances on the open internet and can watch the operations as they run ().

  5. Reuters exclusive and NorForge findings published

    Reuters names Deere, SharkNinja and Cummins as victims, and NorForge's cluster analysis is published the same day (;).

Capabilities and access

  • Tool: Cairn, an open-source "AI problem-solving" platform. Its author, "le1xia0," says it was not designed for hacking (TNW).
  • Models: every task ran on a worker labelled claudecode_deepseek-v4.1-flash.
  • Access: the panels were reachable without a login, typically on port 8000 (The Hacker News).
Read the full section
  • Tool: Cairn, an open-source "AI problem-solving" platform. Its author, "le1xia0," says it was not designed for hacking (TNW).
  • Models: every task ran on a worker labelled claudecode_deepseek-v4.1-flash. That label suggests Claude Code paired with DeepSeek V4.1 Flash, but neither NorForge nor Reuters confirmed which models were used (The Hacker News).
  • Access: the panels were reachable without a login, typically on port 8000 (The Hacker News).

Technical analysis for researchers and developers

  • Agents post what they find to a shared "blackboard," build on each other's findings, and let operators add hints (GridinSoft).
  • Goal: find a code-execution flaw, then plant a hidden file-upload form (a "web shell uploader") to keep access to shop and payment systems (TNW).
  • Example chain: when the public-facing apps held up, the agents found a linked control panel.
Read the full section
  • Coordination: Cairn groups work into projects. Agents post what they find to a shared "blackboard," build on each other's findings, and let operators add hints (GridinSoft).
  • Goal: find a code-execution flaw, then plant a hidden file-upload form (a "web shell uploader") to keep access to shop and payment systems (TNW).
  • Example chain: when the public-facing apps held up, the agents found a linked control panel. They then chained write access to the memcached session store, unsafe PHP object handling and weaknesses in the legacy Zend Framework (The Hacker News).
  • Metrics: about 10% of tasks reached their goal, and successful ones took a little under 23 hours on average. These figures describe this operation only, not AI hacking success rates in general (GridinSoft).

Claims and evidence

  • Over 100 companies breached, more than 1,200 sites attempted. Project counts are tasks, not confirmed breaches (GridinSoft).
  • $5,000 total, about $50 per hack. This is Fagerland's own estimate, given to Reuters.
  • Victim statements:
Read the full section
  • Over 100 companies breached, more than 1,200 sites attempted. This comes from NorForge's view of the attacker's own panels. Project counts are tasks, not confirmed breaches (GridinSoft).
  • $5,000 total, about $50 per hack. This is Fagerland's own estimate, given to Reuters. NorForge's report separately puts the cost at about $5 per task, failures included (Quartz).
  • Victim statements:
  • Deere says it remediated and found no sign that sensitive data was accessed.
  • SharkNinja says only a standalone product-support site was affected.
  • Cummins is investigating a website run by a third-party vendor (BNN Bloomberg/Reuters).
  • Independent corroboration: Reuters confirmed specific victims. No independent replication of the cost or success-rate figures was found.

Context and prior work

  • Anthropic's GTG-1002 report showed agentic intrusion at state level, with humans acting as campaign managers (Anthropic).
  • Gambit's September report had already found Cairn on attacker infrastructure, at about $25 per target in tokens (TNW).
  • Reuters also cites reports from Taiwan and India of AI agents breaching or penetrating live systems (TNW).
Read the full section
  • Anthropic's GTG-1002 report showed agentic intrusion at state level, with humans acting as campaign managers (Anthropic).
  • Gambit's September report had already found Cairn on attacker infrastructure, at about $25 per target in tokens (TNW).
  • Reuters also cites reports from Taiwan and India of AI agents breaching or penetrating live systems (TNW).
  • What is new here is a financially motivated operation that ran almost entirely without humans and at commodity cost.

Limitations, safety and contested findings

  • Reuters could not establish how much data was taken.
  • Finding a planted uploader is not the same as a verified full compromise.
  • Victim impact varied, and Deere and SharkNinja describe limited exposure.
Read the full section
  • Reuters could not establish how much data was taken. One operator it observed did steal card data, and another tried to rob a crypto exchange (BNN Bloomberg/Reuters).
  • Finding a planted uploader is not the same as a verified full compromise. On one backend, uploaded files ran as PHP; on others, they were returned harmlessly (GridinSoft).
  • Victim impact varied, and Deere and SharkNinja describe limited exposure.
  • The exposed panels held hundreds of secrets. NorForge verified 11% as still valid, so anyone else could have picked up stolen credentials (GridinSoft).

Business and practitioner implications

  • Economics: at $5–50 per attempt or breach, it becomes viable to attack mid-sized e-commerce sites with 200,000 to 1.5 million monthly visits (TNW).
  • Patch speed: an agent that spends 23 hours chaining together legacy flaws, such as old Zend or PHP code, makes timely patching more important.
  • Defenders: look for unexpected hidden upload forms, rotate any credentials that may be exposed, and check backend execution settings, not just upload directories (GridinSoft).
Read the full section
  • Economics: at $5–50 per attempt or breach, it becomes viable to attack mid-sized e-commerce sites with 200,000 to 1.5 million monthly visits (TNW).
  • Patch speed: an agent that spends 23 hours chaining together legacy flaws, such as old Zend or PHP code, makes timely patching more important.
  • Defenders: look for unexpected hidden upload forms, rotate any credentials that may be exposed, and check backend execution settings, not just upload directories (GridinSoft).
  • Third-party risk: Cummins' vendor-hosted site shows that supplier web properties are part of the attack surface.
  • Agent builders: Cairn instances left open without a login exposed both victims and operators, so dashboards need authentication.
FOLLOW THE EVIDENCE

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Sources (11)
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